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then assess the policy implications of these models. We find that targeting transfers to 
women can have unintended consequences and may fail to make children better off. 
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is needed to distinguish between alternative theoretical models. 
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The relationship of gender and development is a central issue in development re-
search and policy today. Some of the great interest in the topic stems from empir-
ical ﬁndings suggesting that empowering women may not just be a worthy goal
in its own right, but may in fact promote overall economic development. Specif-
ically, there is evidence that when transfer payments are given to women rather
thantotheirhusbands, expendituresonchildrengoupdisproportionately. Tothe
extent that higher spending on children promotes human-capital accumulation,
this suggests that empowering women may ultimately lead to faster economic
growth.
Already, much practical development policy (such as cash-transfer programs like
PROGRESA or micro-credit programs that are targeted exclusively to women)
is based on the premise of a link from female empowerment to development.
Nevertheless, there is a lack of work on the issue that uses economic theory to
understand the speciﬁc channels that may lead to such a relationship.
In this paper, we examine the link between female empowerment and economic
development from the perspective of economic theories of household decision
making. We develop models that are consistent with the empirical observation
that an increase in female resources leads to more spending on children. We use
these models to address two related questions. First, we focus speciﬁcally on
programs that target transfers to women and aim to raise female income, and
ask whether such policies really make children better off. Second, we consider a
wider range of policies, and ask whether alternative forms of female empower-
ment have similar effects.
While at ﬁrst sight it may seem that existing empirical evidence is sufﬁcient to an-
swer these questions, our theoretical analysis shows that this is not the case. We
demonstrate that the link from the observed empirical patterns to policy implica-
tions is far from obvious: the effects of policy interventions are highly sensitive
to the details of the underlying economic model, unintended consequences can
arise, and different forms of female empowerment can have opposite effects.
As our main theoretical framework, we develop a tractable theory of noncoop-
1erative spousal decision-making with a continuum of household public goods.
Here public goods are goods that both spouses derive utility from; examples in-
clude shelter, furniture, and children. We show that for targeted transfers to have
an effect on the public-good allocation within the household, frictions have to
be introduced that limit the substitution between male and female provision of
public goods. The precise nature of these frictions determines the overall effects
of policy interventions.
One option is to assume hard-wired preference differences between men and
women in terms of the relative appreciation of different public goods (with wo-
men caring more about child-related goods). Such a setting easily reproduces the
empirical ﬁnding that transferring money to women leads to more spending on
children. However, whether such targeted transfers really beneﬁt children is not
obvious: an increase in spending on child-speciﬁc goods comes at the expense
of other household public goods that may also beneﬁt children (such as shelter),
and total spending on public goods may go down.
In an alternative setup, we show that the observed empirical patterns can also
be reproduced without assuming that women and men have different prefer-
ences. Instead, we assume that husband and wife have a different market wage.
Household public goods are differentiated by the importance of goods and time
in producing them. In equilibrium, the low-wage spouse specializes in provid-
ing relatively time-intensive household public goods. Even though preferences
are symmetric, targeted transfers or changes in wages affect male- and female-
provided public goods differently, due to the endogenous specialization pattern
in household production. The model implies that an intervention that leads to
more spending on children does not have to make children better off. One chan-
nel behind this result is the endogenous allocation of time: spending on child
goods and time investments in children can move in opposite directions, leading
to an ambiguous total impact on public good provision and welfare.
Turning to alternative forms of female empowerment, we focus on gender dis-
crimination in private consumption markets. For example, women are some-
times excluded from bars and other forms of entertainment, and the sale of cer-
tain goods to women may be prohibited. We show that when women’s access
2to private consumption goods is restricted, women’s behavior is as if their pref-
erences placed more weight on public goods such as spending on children. In
this way, gender discrimination can be one source of the gender-speciﬁc spend-
ing patterns observed in the data. If now female empowerment takes the form
of reducing such gender discrimination, the apparent preferences of women will
become closer to those of men, leading to less spending on children. Thus, in this
setting female empowerment in terms of reducing discrimination has the oppo-
site effect of empowerment in terms of giving money to women. Similar ﬁndings
can be derived in a dynamic model where gender discrimination takes the form
of limited access for women to savings and investment opportunities.
While our ﬁndings lead to doubts about the effectiveness of female empower-
ment policies as a tool for promoting economic development, taken by them-
selves they do not imply that such policies are misguided. For examples, regard-
ing the effect of targeted transfers on public-good provision, in all model variants
that we have considered there are forces pulling in different directions, so that the
overall impact becomes a quantitative question. Moreover, even at a qualitative
level the potential repercussions of female-empowerment policies are sensitive
to the details of the economic mechanism that breaks the income-pooling result.
As a consequence, the main conclusion arising from this work is that more mea-
surement and theory is needed to arrive at a robust analysis of gender-based de-
velopment policies. Concerning the impact on children, all models suggest that
changes in the provision of a wider range of public goods and time inputs over
multiple years should be measured to paint a more complete picture. Similarly,
studies that measure outcomes (such as anthropometric status) should be pre-
ferred over studies that measure expenditures. In addition, the different models
we have described here have distinct empirical implications that could be tested
directly. Only once we have some conﬁdence in which of these models is a good
description of reality can speciﬁc policy recommendations be given.
On the theoretical side, an important challenge for future research is to model
the link between public-good provision and economic development more explic-
itly. The main reason why public-good provision in the household is thought
to promote development is that investments in children lead to more human-
3capital accumulation. However, explicit models of human-capital accumulation
inthe familydistinguish betweenthe quantityand qualitydimension ofchildren,
i.e., the tradeoff between how many children to have and how much education
to provide them with. Even if an intervention produces an unambiguous in-
crease in spending on children, there still would be no beneﬁt for development
if the additional spending resulted in higher fertility rather than an increase in
education. Thus, combining models of marital bargaining with explicit theories
of human-capital investment will be another important step towards an encom-
passing analysis of gender-based development polices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide
an overview of the empirical ﬁndings that motivate our study. In Section 3, we
review the main theories of marital bargaining and justify our focus on the non-
cooperative bargaining model. In Section 4 we introduce our baseline model and
demonstrate that frictions in the substitution of public-good provision between
women and men are required to overcome the income pooling result. Section 5
introduces such frictions in different ways and contains our main results on the
effects of female empowerment polices. In Section 6 we extend our framework
to a dynamic setting. Section 7 concludes.
2 What are the Facts?
In this section, we survey the empirical literature on the link between female em-
powerment and development. Claims that female empowerment promotes de-
velopment are largely based on empirical evidence that higher female resources
(in the form of income, education, or assets) are associated with higher spending
on children. We provide a review of this evidence, and in the remainder of the
paper we will develop economic models that can reproduce these ﬁndings. We
also brieﬂy discuss a number of studies that focus on other aspects of the link
between female empowerment and development.
42.1 Correlations between Female Income and Child Outcomes
There exists a sizeable literature that uses household data to document correla-
tions between gender-speciﬁc resources and outcomes, speciﬁcally with regard
to spending on children and children’s outcomes. For an early survey of this
literature see Haddad, Hoddinot, and Alderman (1997). Since these studies are
based on observational data, one cannot rule out that the results are driven by
unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., there may be unmeasured ways in which house-
holds with larger female income shares are special. Nevertheless, the ﬁndings in
this literature are suggestive, and they motivate much of the subsequent research
in the area.
Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) uses cross sectional data from the 1986/87 Living
Standards Survey of the Cote d’Ivoire. The authors ﬁnd that an increase in the
wife’s share of income is associated with an increase in the share of expenditures
on food, and a decrease in the share of expenditures on alcohol and cigarettes.1
Based on the same data, Haddad and Hoddinott (1994) ﬁnd that a higher fe-
male income share is associated with a better nutritional status of children (as
measured by height for age), suggesting that at least some of the higher food
expenditures are child related.
Other authors have documented similar ﬁndings for other countries and time pe-
riods. Engle (1993) provides cross-sectional data from Guatemala to show that a
higher female budget share is associated with better children’s nutritional status
(measured by height for age, weight for age, and weight for height). Phipps and
Burton (1998) use data from the 1992 Expenditure Survey in Canada and focus
on married-couple households where both spouses work full time. The authors
ﬁnd that a higher share of wives’ income is correlated with higher expenditures
on child care, children’s clothing, women’s clothing, and food. Kennedy and Pe-
ters (1992) compare female headed with male headed households in Kenya and
Malawiandﬁndthatinfemaleheadedhouseholds(typicallyheadedbyawidow,
who is often the grandmother of the children in the household), a larger share of
the budget is spent on food. The paper also documents better anthropometric
1The study also ﬁnds a decrease in meals eaten out, children’s clothing and adult clothing. But
these ﬁndings are not robust to different speciﬁcations.
5outcomes (weight for age and height for age). For Malawi, the paper also docu-
ments smaller expenditure shares on alcohol. The econometric speciﬁcation does
not control for income, but interestingly female-headed households have better
child anthropometric outcomes despite overall lower incomes. Thomas (1990)
uses Brazilian survey data collected in 1974/75 to study gender differences in
the impact of non-wage income on health and nutrition in Brazil. He ﬁnds that
maternal income increases family nutrition by four to seven times more than in-
come of men. Both total calory intake as well as protein intake is affected more
by female than by male income. Child survival is highly positively related to un-
earned income of mothers, and the effect is 20 times larger compared to unearned
income of men. Maternal income also has a larger effect on two anthropometric
outcomes (weight for height and height for age).
2.2 NaturalExperimentsonFemaleIncomeandChildOutcomes
A second group of papers focuses on natural experiments to verify whether the
observed association between female resources and spending on children has a
causal interpretation. In Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997), such an experiment
is provided by a change in the Child Allowance Law in the 1970s. The univer-
sal child beneﬁt that previously consisted of reduced tax withholding from the
father was replaced by a cash payment to the mother. The authors ﬁnd that the
change in the law signiﬁcantly increased the expenditure of children’s clothing
(and women’s clothing) relative to men’s clothing.2
Duﬂo and Udry (2004) use a natural experiment where exogenous variation in
women’s relative income is produced by variation in rainfall. In Cote d’Ivoire,
women and men cultivate different crops that are differently affected by rainfall.
Duﬂo and Udry (2004) ﬁnd that a rainfall shock that increases women’s relative
incomeincreasesexpendituresonfood. A10percentincreaseinincomefromwo-
men’s crops is associated with a 4 percent increase in expenditure on purchased
foods, while the same increase in men’s crops is associated with a 0.3 percent
decrease.
2See also Ward-Batts (2008) for similar ﬁndings based on a broader set of goods categories.
6Several studies analyze the effects of a major expansion of pension beneﬁts in
South Africa, using national survey data from 1993.3 The question is whether
the gender of a transfer recipient matters for child outcomes. While pension re-
cipients are unlikely to be parents of little children, about one-third of pension
recipients live with children, typically their grandchildren. Duﬂo (2000) ﬁnds in
households where there is a woman receiving an old-age pension compared to
households where no one receives a pension, girls have better anthropometric
status (weight for height and height for age).4 More speciﬁcally, girls in house-
holds with a women receiving the pension have 1.19 standard deviations larger
weight for height. Interestingly, the effect is only signiﬁcant in households where
the pension recipient is the mother of child’s mother, whereas there is no effect
for paternal grandmothers. There is also no signiﬁcant effect of a man receiving
a pension.
Atkin (2009) uses Mexican data to study the effect of mothers’ employment in
manufacturing on children’s height for age. To identify causal effects, geographic
variation in the opening of new factories at the time a woman enters the labor
market is used. The study ﬁnds that child health outcomes improve for mothers
who end up working in manufacturing due to a new factory opening: their chil-
dren are between 1.18 and 1.75 standard deviations taller than children whose
mothers did not have their ﬁrst job in manufacturing. One shortcoming of this
study is that male and female income shares within the household are not ob-
served, so that it is not possible to separate between a general household-level
income effect and an effect that is speciﬁc to female income.
2.3 Randomized Cash Transfer Programs
Several studies have analyzed on the effects of the PROGRESA program in Mex-
ico (Attanasio and Lechene 2002, Rubalcava, Teruel, and Thomas 2009, and Bobo-
nis 2009). PROGRESA is a conditional cash-transfer program that makes trans-
fers to mothers as long as their children meet certain criteria such as keeping up
3Burns, Keswell, and Leibbrandt (2005) gives an overview of South Africa’s pension system
and the literature on the gender dimension of its effects.
4See also Duﬂo (2003) for more details.
7on immunizations and attending school. The introduction of PROGRESA was
randomized, so that causal effects can be isolated. However, randomization took
place only in terms of which families received the beneﬁt, but not in terms of
who in the family received the transfer (all transfers were given to women). This
complicates the identiﬁcation of gender effects, but attempts are made to sepa-
rate the effect of a larger female budget share from a simple income effect due to
the transfer.
The studies ﬁnd that in households that receive the transfer compared to house-
holds that have the same after-transfer income but did not receive the transfer,
the share of income spent on children’s clothing is higher. Attanasio and Lechene
(2002) ﬁnd that an increase in the female income share of 10 percentage points
is associated with an increase in the expenditure share of girls’ clothing by 12
percent and of boys’ clothing by 6 percent. In contrast, higher female income
is associated with a lower share of spending on alcohol. The results regarding
food expenditures are mixed and depend on the regression speciﬁcation (see also
Rubalcava, Teruel, and Thomas 2009). Similar to Attanasio and Lechene (2002),
Rubalcava, Teruel, and Thomas (2009) also ﬁnd a positive effect on the budget
shares of children’s clothing as well as education. Bobonis (2009) exploits ran-
dom variation in rainfall as an instrument for earned income to separate the ef-
fect of a general increase in income from transfers to women speciﬁcally. Using
this methodology, the study conﬁrms the earlier results in that a higher percent-
age of the female income (compared to general earnings) is spent on children’s
clothing.5
A similar conditional cash transfer program in Nicaragua is analyzed in Gitter
5There are two caveats with the PROGRESA-based studies. First, the gender of the transfer
recipient is not random, as all transfers are given to women. Thus, a transfer increase not only
the female budget share, but also total family income. To address this issue, the studies con-
trol for total income. Therefore, the comparison essentially is between households with identical
post-transfer incomes but different female income shares. However, it cannot be ruled out that
pre-transfer income differences are related to other unobserved differences across households. A
second caveat is that PROGRESA is a conditional cash transfer program that links the transfers
to child outcomes, speciﬁcally schooling. Attanasio and Lechene (2002) deal with this problem
ﬁrst by controlling for schooling in their demand estimation and second by using lagged school-
ing decisions as an instrument for schooling. Moreover, Rubalcava, Teruel, and Thomas (2009)
ﬁnds that PROGRESA increases the budget share of child goods only for households where both
mother and father are present, but not for single-parent households.
8and Barham (2008). Once again, the overall ﬁnding is that increased transfer in-
come disproportionately beneﬁts children. The outcome variables are total food
expenditures, education expenditures, and spending on milk.
2.4 Access to Credit
Several studies analyze the impact of female access to credit on expenditure
shares. Pitt and Khandker (1998) study a microcredit quasi-ﬁeld experiment in
Bangladesh in 1991/92. Access to credit was provided in several villages, and
data was collected in both treated and non-treated villages. Households owning
more than half an acre of land were precluded from the experiment. The treat-
ment effect is identiﬁed by comparing households below and above the cutoff
for farm size in treatment versus control villages. The gender effect is identiﬁed
through a speciﬁc feature of the lending scheme: all lending is group based and
groups are single-sex only. Not all villages have both a male and a female group,
which provides variation in access to credit by gender. The authors ﬁnd that
credit provided to women leads to higher household consumption expenditures
and to more schooling for girls, while credit provided to men does not have a sig-
niﬁcant effect on the same variables.6 In contrast, credit to both men and women
has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on boys’ schooling.
Khandker (2005) uses a similar identiﬁcation strategy, but also exploits the panel
dimension of the data by including a follow-up interview in 1998/99. The study
ﬁnds that at the mean, an additional 100 Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) of cumulative
borrowing by women increases annual household expenditures by BDT 15 (BDT
7 for food and BDT 8 for non-food expenditures). The effects are slightly larger in
1998/99 compared to the 1991/92 period. The same numbers for men are small
and insigniﬁcant. The authors interpret this ﬁnding as larger returns to credit
for women. However, the effect cannot be distinguished from the alternative
hypothesis that women borrow for consumption purposes while men borrow to
invest.7
6However, statistical tests cannot reject the equality of men’s and women’s credit effects on
school enrollment of girls and consumption expenditures.
7Indeed, de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2009) ﬁnd that randomized grants provided to
92.5 Other Types of Female Empowerment
Whereas the papers discussed so far are concerned with the effects of female
access to ﬁnancial resources, another branch of the literature puts the spotlight on
measures of female bargaining power. Thomas (1994) uses the relative education
levelofthewifecomparedtothehusbandasaproxyforbargainingpower. Based
on data from the United States, Brazil, and Ghana, the paper documents that the
mother’s education has a bigger effect on the nutritional status of girls (measured
by height for age) compared to the father’s education, while the opposite is true
for boys.
Another important determinant of bargaining power in marriage should be the
value of the outside option. Rubalcava and Thomas (2000) exploit variation over
time and across U.S. states in the aid paid to single women with children (Aid
to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC). AFDC improves the outside op-
tion of married women with children, and therefore might affect their bargaining
power in marriage. Based on PSID data from 1968 through 1992, the authors
show that the presence of AFDC indeed has a signiﬁcant impact on expenditure
shares with marriage. This is especially true for low-income households with
children, those most likely to beneﬁt from AFDC in case of separation. Interest-
ingly, and contrary to studies from developing countries, the food budget share is
lower when female bargaining power is higher.8 Additional data from the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) shows that the share allocated to child goods
(toys, baby clothing, baby furniture) increases, while the share of “male” goods
(alcohol, car maintenance, sports entertainment) decreases. The authors also ﬁnd
an increase in health care spending, which they interpret as human capital in-
vestment.
Bargaining power may also increase in asset holdings. This idea is explored by
Doss (2006). Using data from the Ghana Living Standards Surveys in 1991/92
and 1998/99, the author ﬁnds that in households where women own a larger
women’s micro-enterprises in Sri Lanka have lower returns than those invested in men’s micro-
enterprises.
8The authors hypothesize that women use their increased bargaining power to spend more
time with children and work less in the market, which leads to a decline in food consumed out-
side the home.
10share of assets (land, savings, and business assets), the share of expenditures on
food and education is larger, but the share of alcohol expenditures is smaller.
The share of medical expenses, on the other hand, decreases with female asset
ownership. The authors argue that medical expenses are primarily curative and
speculate that women with higher bargaining power are able to keep their fami-
lies healthier.
Quisumbing (2003) uses relative education and assets at marriage as measures
of bargaining power. Data from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and South
Africa are used to show that bargaining power matters for expenditure shares.
The results differ a lot by country, however. For example, in Bangladesh and
South Africa women’s assets increase expenditure shares on education, while in
Ethiopia men’s assets have this effect. Similarly, female assets have a negative
affect on food budget shares in South Africa. In some countries, women’s asset
ownership increases boys’ schooling relatively more than girls’ schooling, while
in others the reverse is true.
Another form of female empowerment is political empowerment. Chattopad-
hyay and Duﬂo (2004) study how the gender of political leaders affects public
good provision in rural India using data from a natural experiment. In India, one
third of the local government head positions are randomly reserved for women.
The authors ﬁnd that leaders invest relatively more in infrastructure that is rel-
evant to the needs of their own genders. Namely, female leaders favor drinking
water and roads in West Bengal and drinking water in Rajasthan (women collect
drinking water in both places, and are employed building roads in West Bengal).
They invest relatively less in public goods that are linked to men’s concerns: ed-
ucation in West Bengal and roads in Rajasthan. In a follow-up study, Beaman
et al. (2006) analyze how these different policies affect children. They provide
evidence from two Indian states that children in villages headed by female lead-
ers have higher immunization rates and that girls experience an improvement in
school attendance.
112.6 Direct Evidence on Preference Differences
One potential explanation for the observed differences in spending patterns is
that women and men have different preferences. Croson and Gneezy (2009) pro-
vide an overview of the experimental evidence on gender differences in pref-
erences. They conclude that there is robust evidence that women are more risk
aversethanmen. Theyalsodocumentgenderdifferencesinother-regardingpref-
erences such as altruism, inequality aversion, and reciprocity. However, women
are not generally more other-regarding than men. It is not clear how these pref-
erence differences affect parents’ attitudes towards children.
Bauer and Chytilov´ a (2009) speciﬁcally examine how gender differences in pref-
erences depend on the presence of children. They measure the discount rate and
risk aversion using data from lab experiments in rural India. They ﬁnd evidence
of gender differences in the discount rate, but not in attitudes toward risk. In-
terestingly, childless men and women turn out to have the same discount rates,
but women with children under 18 are more patient than men with children. The
more children the women have, the more patient they are relative to men with
the same number of children.
A different kind of evidence on gender differences in preferences is provided by
Woolley (2004). The paper surveys a small sample of couples with children in
Ottawa, Canada, to study gender differences in spending. People were asked
in interviews how they spend their child beneﬁts and what they would do with
unexpected additional income. The study ﬁnds that women are more likely to
say that they would spend a windfall on children and household goods, while
men are more likely to say they would spend the money on savings. However,
the difference is statistically insigniﬁcant.
2.7 Summary
Several patterns emerge from the empirical literature. First, households do not







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14Second, higher female budget shares are associated with higher spending on
food, higher spending on children, as well as a better nutritional status of chil-
dren. Third, higher male budget shares are often associated with higher spend-
ing on alcohol and tobacco, and sometimes with higher savings. Tables 1 and
2 summarize the literature that establishes these ﬁndings.9 Even though each
individual study has certain shortcomings and identifying causal effects is difﬁ-
cult, the fact that a variety of studies using different data sources and empirical
methodologies arrive at essentially the same conclusions strongly suggests that
these ﬁndings are robust features of the data.
In the remainder of this paper, we will develop models of household decision
making that are consistent with the empirical ﬁndings. The empirical evidence
has implications for what such a model has to look like. In particular, the data re-
ject income pooling, which implies that some form of conﬂict of interest between
husband and wife is a necessary ingredient for a successful model. However, the
data do not give us clear guidance for the nature of this conﬂict of interest. One
possibility is that women and men have fundamentally different preferences, but
the empirical evidence on this point is not strong. Indeed, we will see that one
can formulate models of household decision making that can reproduce the em-
pirical ﬁndings without relying on preference asymmetries between women and
men.
3 Alternative Models of Spousal Decision Making
The main part of our analysis of gender and development is based on a nonco-
operative model of decision making in marriage. This provides a contrast to the
majority of the existing literature, where the unitary model and cooperative bar-
gaining models of marital decision making are the most common. In this section,
we brieﬂy review these alternative models, and justify our focus on the nonco-
operative case.
9The tables include only those studies that speciﬁcally examine how female resources affect
expenditure shares.
15Becker (1973) models marriage as a union in which two economic agents be-
come one: within marriage, couples maximize a single utility function subject to
a single budget constraint in which all income is pooled.10 As a simple example,
consider a couple where husband and wife have incomes yf and ym, and where
this income is spent on the wife’s private consumption cf, the husband’s private
consumption cm, and a public good C (such as expenditures on children). The






cf + cm + C · yf + ym:
An immediate implication of this maximization problem is that the distribution
of income between husband and wife has no impact on the outcome of decision
making: income only enters as the sum yf + ym. Hence, even though the uni-
tary model has proved to be useful in many other applications, clearly it cannot
speak to the observation that the source of income does affect the consumption
allocation.
Recognizing the limitations of the unitary model, cooperative bargaining models
of marriages allow for the possibility of a conﬂict of interest between the spouses.
Ratherthanpositingajointutilityfunction, eachspousehasseparatepreferences,
andtotheextentthattheirpreferencesaredifferentthespouseshavetobargainto
arrive at a decision. The deﬁning characteristic of cooperative bargaining models
is that the bargaining process is efﬁcient, i.e., the spouses arrive at a decision that
is a Pareto optimum. As such, the outcome of any cooperative bargaining model
can be represented as the solution of a Pareto problem, with different weights




fµuf(cf;cm;C) + (1 ¡ µ)um(cf;cm;C)g (2)
10The unitary utility function can be interpreted as the joint objective of two spouses who have
identical preferences, or alternatively as the personal utility function of the spouse who has sole
decision making power, while also being altruistic towards the other spouse.
16subject to:
cf + cm + C · yf + ym:
Different cooperative bargaining models differ in how the welfare weights µ and
1 ¡ µ are determined. One possibility is to provide an explicit game-theoretic
foundation for the bargaining process. In the models studied by Manser and
Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981), the spouses engage in Nash bar-
gaining, where the outside option is given by the utility upon divorce. Implic-
itly, the couple maximizes the product of two partner’s marital surpluses. The
outcome of this process corresponds to the maximization problem (2) for a par-
ticular choice of the welfare weight µ. The separate-spheres bargaining model of
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) follows similar lines, but this time the outside option
is provided by a state of noncooperation within marriage rather than divorce.
The collective bargaining models developed in Chiappori (1988) and Chiappori
(1992) generalize this class of models by only requiring the outcome to be Pareto
optimal. That is, rather than relying on one particular process for the determina-
tion of the welfare weights, the collective model only requires that the outcome is
generated by the maximization problem (2) for some relative weight µ, where in
empirical implementations µ can be a function of a variety of variables thought
to be relevant for marital decision making.
Under which circumstances do cooperative bargaining models imply that the
distribution of income between husband and wife affects the household alloca-
tion? An inspection of the maximization problem (2) provides the answer. First,
it is necessary that the two spouses indeed have different preferences, because
otherwise the decision problem reduces to the unitary model as in (1). Second,
assuming that preferences are different, the only way in which relative male and
female income could matter is through the welfare weight µ. For a ﬁxed µ, income
once again only enters as the sum yf + ym, so that the distribution of income be-
tween husband and wife is irrelevant. Thus, cooperative bargaining models can
reproducetheempiricalﬁndingsonlyifµ isafunctionofrelativemaleandfemale
income. Under Nash bargaining with divorce as a the threat point, for example,
changes in male and female income are only relevant to the extent that they shift
relative income after divorce; any changes that apply only while the spouses are
17married should have no effect.
Some progress can be made by positing that the welfare weights directly de-
pend on the variables one is interested in, such as relative income earned within
marriage (see Basu 2006 for some work along these lines). In what follows, we
nevertheless focus on a different model of marital decision making, namely non-
cooperative bargaining.11 We offer three complementary justiﬁcations of this
choice. First, simply assuming that welfare weights depend on income tells us
little about the underlying economic process that gives rise to these bargaining
weights. Implicitly, it is often assumed that income matters because it would
matter in an underlying noncooperative game that serves as the threat point for
the cooperative bargaining game, along the lines of Lundberg and Pollak (1993).
Thus, even if one preferred the cooperative model, examining the underlying
noncooperative game is still a key step in the overall analysis, and our work can
be interpreted in this manner. Second, one particular version of the noncoopera-
tive model (analyzed in Section 5.1 below) has predictions that are quite similar
to the cooperative model with preference differences and welfare weights de-
pending on income. Thus, little is lost by focusing on the noncooperative model
throughout. Third, and most importantly, we will see (in Section 5.3) that the
noncooperative model can also generate an effect of the spousal income distribu-
tion on allocations in a setting where there is no preference asymmetry between
husbands and wives at all. Thus, the noncooperative model leads to a more en-
compassing analysis that nests the main implications of the cooperative model
(other than Pareto efﬁciency), but also gives rise to an alternative interpretation
of the empirical ﬁndings with quite different policy implications. To the extent
that the mechanisms underlying this alternative model are empirically relevant
(as we think they are), considering the noncooperative model is essential for a
comprehensive analysis of gender-based development policies.
11A hybrid between cooperative- and noncooperative bargaining are provided by limited com-
mitment models, in which spouses can commit to a particular allocation within the marriage,
but cannot commit not to walk away from the marriage. Similar to the Nash bargaining mod-
els, relative income matters here only insofar they also imply differential income upon divorce,
see Ligon (2002) and Voena (2010). Examples of noncooperative bargaining models applied to
marriage include Browning (2000) and Anderson and Baland (2002). In the latter paper, the only
decision that is taken noncooperatively is whether to join a rotating savings and credit association
(ROSCA).
184 Noncooperative Bargaining and Income Pooling
In this section, we introduce our general noncooperative bargaining framework.
We envision a family consisting of two decision makers, a wife and a husband,
who have separate incomes and who decide on the provision of private goods
and public goods (i.e., goods from which both spouses derive utility).12 A com-
mon feature of the various models that we consider is that there is a continuum of
public goods. The existence of many of public goods implies that one part of the
outcome of the bargaining game is an assignment of which public goods are pro-
vided by each spouse. As we will see, the ease of substitution along this dimen-
sion will play a key role for the overall results.13 While the speciﬁc assumption
of a continuum of goods is an idealized abstraction, we believe it is realistic to
posit that a variety of public goods are provided within marriage, ranging from
shelter and food to the various time and goods expenditures relating to children.
We start by establishing two different results. First, we show that noncoopera-
tive decision making combined with the assumption that one spouse cares more
about public good provision is not sufﬁcient to break the income pooling result.
This result serves as a point of departure for our further analysis, where we dis-
cuss various ways to break the income pooling result. Second, we brieﬂy discuss
one common argument against noncooperative models of marriage, namely that
spouses playing a repeated game should be able to ﬁnd ways to overcome the
inefﬁciency implied by noncooperative behavior. We counter this criticism by
arguing that when altruism between the spouses is taken into account, the non-
cooperative outcome may in fact be fairly close to being efﬁcient. The fact that
the spouses play a Nash equilibrium does not imply that they do not care for
each other. We show below that with sufﬁcient altruism there is little need for
additional cooperation to avoid inefﬁcient outcomes.
12Extensions to more decision makers are possible, including the cases of polygamy, children
with some independent decision power, and extended families who are linked by the consump-
tion of joint public goods.
13The existing literature on non-cooperative marital bargaining has usually relied on a setting
with a ﬁnite number of goods (such as one private and one public good), which leads to either
local income-pooling or corner solutions.
194.1 Income Pooling Result in the Basic Model with Continuum
of Public Goods









Here cf and cm are the private-good consumption of wife and husband, and the
Ci are a continuum of public goods for the household, indexed from 0 to 1. The
parameters °f > 0 and °m > 0 denote the utility wife and husband derive from
public goods relative to private goods. The functions u and U are both increasing,
strictly concave, continuously differentiable, and satisfy the usual Inada condi-
tions.
The incomes of wife and husband are given by yf and ym. Husband and wife face








Cm;i di = ym;
where Cf;i and Cm;i are the wife’s and husband’s contributions to public good i,
so that we have:
Ci = Cf;i + Cm;i:
We are interested in Nash equilibria where each spouse separately chooses pri-
vate consumption and public-good contributions, taking as given the choices of
the other spouse. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Income Pooling) For any yf and ym, any Nash equilibrium implies a








The left inequality holds with equality if the wife makes positive contributions to public
goods, i.e.,
R 1
0 Cf;i di > 0, and the right inequality holds with equality if the husband
makes a positive contribution. For any yf, ym that imply positive contributions from
both wife and husband, the allocation depends only on the total income yf + ym, and not
on the allocation of income between the spouses.
Proof: Consider ﬁrst spending on public goods. Taking as given the expendi-




for all i that spouse g contributes to and all other j 2 [0;1]. Moreover, given the
Inada condition in equilibrium for any public good i there is at least one spouse





are both satisﬁed, implying that all public goods are provided at the same level















where the choices have to satisfy the joint budget constraint:
cf + C + cm = yf + ym ´ Y: (7)
Let c?
f;c?
m;C? denote the consumption values that satisfy (6) given the joint bud-
21get constraint (7) with total income Y . Because of the assumed strict concavity of
utility, these values are unique. For any income values that satisfy yf + ym = Y ,
yf ¸ c?
f, and ym ¸ c?
m, the allocation c?
f;c?
m;C? satisﬁes both individual optimality
conditions and budget constraints and is therefore the unique equilibrium alloca-
tion. In this region we observe income pooling, in the sense that the allocation is
uniquely pinned down by yf +ym = Y . In a case where yg < c?
g, the equilibrium is
a corner solution with cg = yg and only one spouse contributing to public goods.
In a corner solution, redistributing income towards the spouse that provides the
public goods will increase total public-good spending. 2
In the interior region, the equilibrium reacts to changes in relative income by
changing the fraction of public goods provided by each spouse. For example,
transferring x dollars from husband to wife leads to a decline of public-good
spending by the husband of x dollars and an equal increase in the wife’s spend-
ing, leaving the overall allocation unchanged. Notice that there is an indetermi-
nacy in terms of which public goods are provided by which spouse; only the total
spending by each spouse is determined.
Thus, we see that even if there is a preference asymmetry between the spouses
and if decision making is noncooperative, reshufﬂing of income between the
spouses still has no effect on the consumption allocation, unless one spouse ends
up with so little income that he or she no longer contributes to any of the pub-
lic goods. This result is familiar from the literature on the private provision of
public goods, see Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), and has previously been
established in noncooperative marital bargaining models by Lundberg and Pol-
lak (1994), among others.14
Before proceeding to models that overcome the income pooling result, we would
like to remark on the efﬁciency of the noncooperative outcome.
4.2 Altruism and Efﬁciency
TheincomepoolingresultmaysuggestthattheNashequilibriumoutcomesolves
a planning problem. This is not quite correct, because the objective function im-
14See also Browning, Chiappori, and Lechene (2009).










whereas a social planner with the same relative welfare weights on female and










That is, the planner accounts for the fact that both spouses care about public
goods and would therefore give more weight to the public goods. In the Nash
equilibrium, each spouse disregards the utility that the other derives from public
goods, which leads to an inefﬁciency in public-good provision. The inefﬁciency
of the Nash outcome is sometimes used to argue against the use of noncoopera-
tive bargaining theory in a family context, based on the conjecture that in a long
repeated relationship the partners should be able to ﬁnd ways to avoid this inef-
ﬁciency. In defense of the noncooperative approach, we would like to point out
that the inefﬁciency would also be lowered by altruism. Consider a variant of
our model in which the spouses care for each other with weight ® 2 (0;1). That
is, utility is:




where ¡g denotes the spouse of g. Assuming that income inequality is not sufﬁ-
ciently extreme for one spouse to directly contribute to the other spouse’s private
consumption, and focusing for simplicity on the case °f = °m = 1, the objective
function implicitly maximized by the Nash equilibrium is:




whereas a social planner would solve:




23Thus, as ® approaches one, the two problems converge, and the inefﬁciency in
public-good consumption becomes arbitrarily small. It is important to recog-
nize that altruism does not rule out noncooperative bargaining; to the contrary,
the more altruistic the spouses are, the closer the Nash equilibrium comes to the
efﬁcient outcome, and the less need there is to ﬁnd ways (such as playing com-
plicated trigger strategies in a dynamic-game context) to avoid this inefﬁciency.
Thus, given that in reality spouses probably display at least some altruism, in our
view the Nash outcome may be quite reasonable. Introducing altruism does not
lead to any qualitative changes in our results. For simplicity, we therefore frame
most of the remaining analysis without altruism, but all arguments would carry
through if some altruism were introduced.
5 Policy Implications of Models that Overcome the
Income-Pooling Result
The intuition for the income pooling result is that if there is a reshufﬂing of in-
come between the spouses, in equilibrium the spouse receiving a raise in income
will use the entire raise to increase spending on public goods, whereas the other
spouse will lower public-good spending by the same amount, leaving the alloca-
tion unchanged. To formulate a model that overcomes the income pooling result,
we need to introduce frictions in the substitution of one spouse’s contribution to
public goods by that of the other spouse. In this section, we discuss three exten-
sions of our basic framework that introduce such a friction in different ways.
The ﬁrst extension uses the brute force of an ad hoc assumption, namely, we im-
pose a technological assumption that the public-good contributions of wife and
husband are not perfect substitutes. The resulting model provides a plausible
representation of the intuition underlying policies that channel funds to women.
We use this model to discuss a potential origin of the appearance of gender dif-
ferences in preferences, namely discrimination in product markets.
From the perspective of economic theory, however, the ﬁrst model is somewhat
unsatisfactory, because it relies on a strong assumption that lacks an obvious
24justiﬁcation. We therefore go on to discuss alternative variations of the basic
framework that deliver the desired result through more explicit economic mech-
anisms. One of these extension relies in differences in the relative appreciation
of different public goods across genders, while the third model does not require
any preference differences at all, and is instead based on variation in the tech-
nology used for producing different public goods. We will see that the policy
implications arising from these alternative models cast some doubts on the use
of gender-targeted transfers in development policy.
5.1 Limited Substitutability of Male and Female Contributions
to Public Goods
Given that the income-pooling result is due to substitution between male and
female provision of speciﬁc goods, the simplest path to breaking the result is
to introduce an assumption that male and female contributions are not perfect
substitutes. For added tractability, we make this point using speciﬁc functional-
form assumptions for utility and technology, namely logarithmic utility com-
bined with a Cobb-Douglas technology that combines the two spouses’ contri-
butions to public goods. If we denote the wife’s and husband’s contributions to
public good i by Ef;i and Em;i, the amount Ci of this public good produced and




As in the previous section, we allow for the possibility that women and men have






15Allowing for unequal shares in the production of public goods leads to qualitatively identical
results.




Eg;i di = yg: (11)
Given logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas technology, this model delivers the
sharp result that male and female contributions to public goods do not interact
at all: male and female choices are independent of each other. If women care
more about the provision of public goods, redistributing income to women will
lead to more total spending on public goods. However, even if total spending
on public goods goes up, consumption may still fall, because unbalanced male
and female contributions can also lead to low provision of public goods. The
following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 For any yf and ym, the share of public good spending in total income is
given by: R 1













If °f > °m, public-goods expenditure for a given total income yf + ym is maximized
by allocating all income to the wife. The production and consumption of public goods is
maximized by setting:
yf = ym:







[log(Ef;i) + log(Em;i)] di:
Given that the other spouse’s spending enters as a constant, the wife’s and hus-
band’s choices are independent of each other. The ﬁrst-order conditions for opti-









of total spending, as stated in the proposition. Writing Y = yf + ym for total












which is maximized by setting yf = Y=2 or, equivalently, yf = ym. 2
To summarize, the model with limited substitutability between female and male
contributions to public goods can indeed reproduce the ﬁnding that reallocating
funds from men to women leads to more spending on public goods (of which
spending on children is a speciﬁc subcategory). At the same time, in terms of
policy implications a ﬁrst caveat arises, namely that maximizing spending on
public goods is not equivalent to maximizing the provision of public goods. In
our speciﬁc example, spending on public goods is maximized (for a given total
household income) by allocating all income to the wife. In contrast, the provi-
sion of public goods is maximized by allocating the same income to husband
and wife. Maximizing spending would in fact lead to a minimization of the pro-
duction and consumption of public goods, because the husband’s contributions
are essential and hence no production is possible without giving at least some
income to the husband.16 Perhaps this caveat is of limited relevance in a world
where husbands still command the greater share of resources even after a policy
intervention. Nevertheless, it is useful to bear in mind that ultimately outcomes,
not spending, is what matters for welfare.
The implications of the noncooperative model with a limited substitutability of
female and male contributions to public goods are very similar to those of a coop-
erative bargaining model where the welfare weights attached to each spouse are
increasing in the spouse’s share of household income. In either case, giving more
income to the wife implies that the distribution of spending between public and
private consumption moves towards the wife’s preferences, with the opposite be-
ing true if the husband gains income. In this sense, this model can be interpreted
16If one of the spouses’ wealth becomes very low, it would be in the interest of the other spouse
to make a voluntary wealth transfer to increase the provision of public goods. In an extended
model where such transfers are allowed, there is a range of extreme wealth distributions for
which transfers are positive. Within this range redistributing wealth between the spouses has no
effect on the margin, because the change would be fully offset by an adjustment of the transfer.
Our results (which assume that transfers are impossible) still hold for a range of intermediate
wealth distributions where neither partner chooses to make a voluntary transfer.
27as also representing the implications of cooperative bargaining models.17
The model can also be used to shed light on the question of whether alternative
forms of female empowerment have similar effects. So far, we have only con-
sidered empowerment in monetary terms, by redistributing income between the
spouses. We can bring another dimension of empowerment into the picture by
examining potential sources of a preference gap between women and men.
Notice that our results so far rely on the assumption that women have a greater
relative appreciation for public goods, °f > °m. But why would women care
more about public goods? One possibility is that such differences have deep-
rooted biological sources and ultimately arose through evolution.18 However,
even if biological differences exist, it is not obvious that they can account for all
of the observed preference gap between women and men. To elaborate on this
point, we now present a variation of the previous model in which the appearance
preferencedifferencesisitselfduetogenderdiscrimination, intheformoflimited
access for women to private consumption goods.
Consider an extension of the model where there is not just a continuum of pub-
lic goods, but also a continuum of private consumption goods. Ng denotes the
numberofprivateconsumptiongoodsthatisavailableforgender g. Thisnumber
may differ across genders for legal reasons. For example, there may be restric-
tions in place that prohibit the sale of certain goods (such a alcohol) to women or
that limit women’s access to bars and other entertainment venues. In the model,
such restrictions would be represented as a smaller range of private consump-
tion goods being available for women, Nf < Nm. To focus exclusively on the
impact of the availability of private consumption goods, we use the model with-
out any biological preference differences, i.e., °f = °m = 1. The utility function
17However, under cooperative bargaining there would be no discrepancy between maximiz-
ing spending on public goods and maximizing production of public goods, which is due to the
inefﬁciency of noncooperative decision making.
18To the extent that public goods represent spending on and care for children, one possible
evolutionary cause of preference differences is paternity uncertainty on the part of men; see the
discussion in Doepke and Tertilt (2009). Additional evolutionary theories are summarized in
Kokko and Jennions (2008).












Eg;i di = yg:
The production function is still given by (9) above. The following proposition
summarizes what this model implies for spending on public goods.
Proposition 3 The share of spending on public goods in the model with limited access








Speciﬁcally, for any yf and ym, the share of public good spending in total income is given
by: R 1













If Nf < Nm, public-goods expenditure for a given total income yf + yf is maximized
by allocating all income to the wife. Thus, empowering women in the sense of allocating
them extra income increases public-good spending. In contrast, female empowerment in
the sense of increasing access to private consumption, i.e., raising Nf, lowers public good
spending.
Proof: It is sufﬁcient to show that the decision problem is equivalent to the













29For a given total spending cg, it is clearly optimal to set spending on each speciﬁc
private good to cg;i = cg=Ng, i.e., spending across varieties is equalized. We can














Eg;i di = yg
and Ci =
p
Ef;iEm;i as before. Notice that the budget constraint is now identical
to (11). We still need to show that the utility function is equivalent to (10). Given
that preferences are invariant to monotone transformations of a utility function,







This is (10) for °g = 1=Ng, which shows that the decision problems are indeed
equivalent. 2
To summarize, we see that the appearance of a preference gap between men
and women may itself be a consequence of gender discrimination. In male-
dominated societies, restrictions on private female consumption are quite plau-
sible; there are countries, for example, where women are not allowed to visit
bars, movie theaters, or in some cases even to drive cars. Our ﬁndings imply
that different forms of female empowerment can have opposite implications for
spending on public goods. If women are handed more money while restrictions
on their private consumption stay in place, by necessity they will spend a large
fraction of the funds on public goods, leading to higher public-good spending
overall. If, in contrast, empowerment takes the form of improving women’s ac-
cess to markets for private consumption, spending on public goods goes down.
The model also hints at the possibility that the effect of income redistribution
within the household on public-good spending may vary with the level of devel-
30opment. If in the course of development restrictions on female private consump-
tion are lifted, then women’s apparent preferences would converge to those of
men, so that redistributing income within the family would have a smaller effect
on public-good spending.
5.2 Gender Differences in the Relative Appreciation of Differ-
ent Public Goods
In the models presented in the previous section, the income-pooling result did
not hold because we assumed, essentially, that male and female contributions
to public goods enter utility separately. At face value, this assumption seems
problematic: why should male and female contributions to public goods be in-
herently different? We now proceed to models that can break the income pooling
result while maintaining the assumption that, in principle, there is no difference
between female and male provision. One way of accomplishing this is by intro-
ducing a more subtle preference asymmetry: rather than assuming that women
place more weight on public goods in general, we assume that women and men
differ in their relative appreciation of different public goods. There are some
public goods that women ﬁnd particularly important, while others are relatively









(1 ¡ i) log(Ci) di; (14)
That is, husband and wife have symmetric preferences overall, but they evaluate
the continuum of public goods differently. The public goods are indexed in such
a manner that women’s relative preference for a good rises with the index i. The
good with index i = 0 is equivalent to a private male good, the good with index
i = 1 is a private female good, and in between is a continuum of goods that are
19For example, one could imagine that women care more about expenditures on children while
men care more about shelter and transportation.
31appreciated by both spouses, but to varying degrees. We return to the assump-
tion that female and male contributions are perfect substitutes, Ci = Cf;i + Cm;i,








Cm;i di = ym:
Once again, each spouse chooses private consumption and public-good contri-
butions to maximize utility, taking as given the choices of the other spouse. The
unique Nash equilibrium for this noncooperative bargaining game features spe-
cialization: each spouse provides those public goods that he or she cares about
the most. A reshufﬂing of wealth between the spouses still leads to a change in
the range of public goods provided by each spouse; in particular, a spouse expe-
riencing an increase in wealth will provide more of the public goods. Unlike in
Proposition 1, however, this adjustment no longer implies that the overall allo-
cation is invariant with respect to wealth redistribution. As the cutoff between
female and male provision of public goods shifts, there is also a change in the rel-
ative appreciation of the public good that forms the cutoff. The spouse that gains
in wealth will value the public good that forms the new cutoff relatively less than
the good that was formerly at the cutoff. This effect slows down the substitution
between female and male provision of public goods, and therefore breaks the
income-pooling result. The following proposition summarizes the features of the
equilibrium.
Proposition 4 There is a unique Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium is characterized by
a cutoff¹ i such that all public goods in the interval i 2 [0;¹ i] are provided by the husband,






(1 ¡ i) cm for i 2 [0;¹ i];
i cf for i 2 (¹ i;1]:
(15)
32The cutoff¹ i is determined such that female and male provision of public goods is equalized
at the cutoff, i.e.,¹ i satisﬁes:
¹ i cf = (1 ¡¹ i) cm: (16)
Proof: The ﬁrst-order conditions for public-good provision from a female and
male perspective imply:
Ci ¸ i cf; (17)
Ci ¸ (1 ¡ i) cm; (18)
where (17) holds with equality for public goods that the wife contributes to, and
(18) holds with equality for public goods that the husband contributes to. We
therefore have:
Ci = maxfi cf;(1 ¡ i) cmg;
which implies that any equilibrium allocation has to satisfy the cutoff rule de-
scribed in (15) and (16) for some¹ i.
To establish the existence of a unique allocation satisfying these conditions, we
note that the equilibrium allocation also has to satisfy budget constraints. The




Cm;i di = ym;




2 + 2¹ i ¡¹ i2:
The husband’s preference Cm;¹ i for public-good provision at the cutoff¹ i can then
be expressed as:
Cm;¹ i =
(1 ¡¹ i) 2ym
2 + 2¹ i ¡¹ i2 ´ ¹ C(m;¹ i):
For ¹ i 2 [0;1], this expression is strictly decreasing in ¹ i, with ¹ C(m;0) = ym and
¹ C(m;1) = 0. Similarly, the female budget constraint yields the following map-




The preference for public-good provision at the cutoff therefore is:
Cf;¹ i =
¹ i 2yf
3 ¡¹ i2 ´ ¹ C(f;¹ i);
which is strictly increasing in¹ i for¹ i 2 [0;1], with ¹ C(f;0) = 0 and ¹ C(f;1) = yf.
So far we have found unique choices for private consumption ad public-good
contributions, taken the cutoff ¹ i as given. To establish the existence of a unique
cutoff¹ i, notice that the condition (16) characterizing the cutoff can be written as:
¹ C(f;¹ i) = ¹ C(m;¹ i):
Given that we established that the left-hand side is strictly increasing and the
right-hand side is strictly increasing in¹ i, with at least one crossing point in [0;1],
there exists a unique cutoff ¹ i satisfying this condition. Therefore, there exists a
unique equilibrium. 2
Notice that unlike in the model considered in Section 5.1, in this framework there
can never be a situation where one spouse would like to voluntarily transfer
funds to the other to increase the production of public goods. Similarly, unlike
the model considered in Section 4.1 there is no possibility of a corner solution
where only one spouse contributes to public goods. Even for extreme distribu-
tions of wealth between the spouses, there is always a range of public goods that
the poorer spouse appreciates sufﬁciently more than the richer spouse for the
poorer spouse to voluntarily supply these goods.
Given the equilibrium characterization, we can now assess how changes in the
division of income or targeted income transfers affect the outcome. When female
income increases keeping male income constant, the wife’s willingness to pay
also goes up relative to that of the husband, so that ¹ i declines and more public
goods are provided by the wife. Consumption of all public and private goods
increases, because the wife has more money and the husband ends up providing
34fewer public goods. However, the consumption of public goods provided by
the wife increases relatively more. Intuitively, a decline in the cutoff ¹ i implies
that the wife cares less about the good at the new cutoff compared to the old
one, whereas the husband cares more. This shift in the relative appreciation of
the good at the cutoff implies that the cutoff has to move by a smaller amount
to equate the wife’s and husband’s provision at the cutoff compared to the case
where the relative appreciation of all public goods is the same for husband and
wife. The smaller change in the cutoff implies that the wife’s increase in income
is spent on a smaller range of public goods, so that provision goes up by more.
We can also characterize how the overall spending on public goods depends on
the distribution of income between husband and wife. Here we ﬁnd that overall
spending on public goods is minimized when wife and husband each have one-
half of the total household income, whereas spending reaches its highest level
when one spouse has all the income. The intuition for this ﬁnding is that the inef-
ﬁciency in public good provision is largest for an even income distribution. With
an even income distribution, each spouse disregards the effect of public-goods
provision on the other spouse’s utility, leading to inefﬁciently low provision. If,
in contrast, one spouse has all the money, spending is Pareto optimal, although
of course the allocation is an extreme one where one spouse does not consume at
all. The following corollary summarizes these ﬁndings.
Corollary 1 Consider the equilibrium for given incomes yf, ym with a corresponding
cutoff¹ i between male and female public good provision. The ratio of total consumption of








1 ¡¹ i +¹ i
2¢
: (19)
Total public goods expenditures are u-shaped in the income ratio. In particular, the ratio
is minimized at ¹ i = 0:5, which corresponds to an equal income division yf = ym, and
maximized at the two extremes¹ i = 0 and¹ i = 1, which corresponds to the cases of either
the wife or the husband having all the income.
Consider now the change in the equilibrium after a transfer Tf > 0 is given to the wife,
resulting in total income ~ yf = yf + Tf. Let ~ cf, ~ cm, and ~ Ci denote the new equilibrium
35allocation. Given the increase in female resources, the cutoff between male and female
public goods provision will shift to the left. Let ~ i < ¹ i be the new cutoff. Let i < ~ i be
a good that is male provided both before and after the change in income, and j > ¹ i be
a good that is female-provided in each case. After the income transfer, the ratio of the
female-provided to the male-provided public good goes up by a factor:








Proof: Given (15) and using (16), the ratio of total consumption of public goods






0(1 ¡ i)cm di +
R 1











(2 ¡¹ i)¹ i






1 ¡¹ i +¹ i
2¢
;
as stated in the proposition. For the second part, notice that (15) implies that for

















from which (20) follows. 2
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these results. Figure 1 display total spending on public
goodsasafractionoftotalincomeasafunctionofthefemaleincomeshare. When
either the wife or the husband has all the money (income share zero or one),
public spending makes up one-third of overall spending, while private goods ac-
count for the remaining two-thirds. This outcome is a Pareto optimum where the
entire welfare weight is attached to only one of the spouses. Since each spouse,




























Figure 1: Share of Public Consumption as a Function of Female Income Share
on average, cares only half as much about public goods as about private goods,
public spending is one-half of private spending. As the female income share
increases, the share of public goods decreases, and reaches a minimum when
income is evenly distributed among the spouses (a female income share of 0.5).
The decline in spending is due to the inefﬁciency in public-good provision that
arises because each spouse does not take into account the utility that the other
spouse derives from public goods. To gain intuition, consider what happens if
we start from the point where one spouse has all the income, and then transfer
some money to the other spouse. It the transfer is small, the rich spouse will still
provide most of the public goods. Consequently, the rich spouse will reduce pub-
lic and private consumption roughly in proportion with overall spending. The
poor spouse, however, ends up providing only few public goods, and therefore
spends most of the transferred income on private consumption. The net effect is
an increase in private consumption and a decrease in public consumption.




























Figure 2: Provision of Public Goods After Transfer to Husband or Wife
Figure 2 displays the pattern of spending across the different public goods as
a function of income transfers. The solid line is the baseline case in which the
husband’s income is twice of wife’s income, ym=yf = 2. Public good provision
follows a V-shaped pattern, where the minimum corresponds to the cutoff be-
tween male and female provision. The dashed line shows the new equilibrium
after a transfer is given to the wife, keeping the husband’s income constant.20 The
cutoff for public-goods provision moves to the left, implying that the wife now
provides a wider range of goods. The provision of all public goods increases, on
the wife’s side because she has more income, and on the husband’s side because
the income is spread among fewer public goods. However, as shown in Corol-
lary 1, the increase in provision is much larger for the public goods provided by
the wife, who is the one receiving the transfer. The dotted line shows what the
equilibrium would be if the same transfer had been given to the husband instead.
20The transfer in the example amounts to ten percent of the original family income.
38This time the cutoff moves to the right, and as expected we observe a much larger
increase in the provision of male-provided goods compared to female-provided
goods.
Tosummarize, weseethatthemodelwithvariationintherelativeappreciationof
different public goods reproduces the observation that giving money to women
or men has different effects. To be consistent with the empirical ﬁnding that
women are more likely to spend funds on children, we would have to assume
that child goods such as children’s clothing and food are goods that women have
a relatively high appreciation for (high i). In particular, if child goods are female-
provided both before and after an income transfer to women, we would observe
a larger increase in spending on child goods compared to the situation where
men receive the same transfer. We haven’t speciﬁed the underlying causes of
preference variation across genders, but if the different appreciation of different
public goods is related to traditional gender roles and the division of labor within
the household, a scenario where women care relatively more about child goods
appears plausible.
Does the model imply that targeting transfers to women is good development
policy? To give a precise answer we would have to specify a richer model which
clariﬁes exactly how spending on the various public goods affects development.
But even at a general level, the model points to a few caveats that suggest that
the link between targeted transfers and welfare might be more complicated than
apparent at ﬁrst sight. To begin, one should note that in this framework the key
tradeoff is between the provision of different public goods, as opposed to the
overall provision of public and private goods. As Figure 2 shows, the increase in
the spending on female-preferred goods that can be achieved through a targeted
transfer comes at a cost of less provision of other, male-preferred public goods.
To give policy advice, one would need to specify how the various public goods
affectdevelopmentandwelfare. Forempiricalresearch, theoutcomesuggestthat
one should look for the impact of targeted transfers on the entire range of public
goods, rather than focusing on speciﬁc categories such as spending on children.
The concern about the provision of other public goods is ampliﬁed by the ﬁnd-
ing, displayed in in Figure 1, that overall spending on public goods is mini-
39mized when women and men have the same income. Assuming that men start
out richer than women, targeting transfers to women would move overall pub-
lic goods provision closer to the minimum. Once again, a full welfare analysis
would require a richer model that speciﬁes the welfare implications of the pro-
vision of different public goods in detail. Nevertheless, the framework suggests
that targeting transfers to women may be more problematic that initially appar-
ent.
5.3 The Gender Wage Gap and Household Production of Public
Goods
So far, we have relied on differences in preferences across genders to reproduce
the ﬁnding that targeting transfers to women has distinct effects on public-good
spending. We now consider a model that achieves the same outcome without
assuming any asymmetry in preferences. The key new feature is a household
production function that produces public goods by combining goods and time
inputs. Different public goods are distinguished by the relative importance of
goods and time in producing them. The only asymmetry between men and wo-
men is a difference in their market wage. In this model, if women’s wages are
lower and hence their time is less valuable, they will endogenously specialize
in providing the public goods that are the most intensive in time. Even though
women don’t care about the goods that they provide more than their husbands
do, any transfer income given to women has a disproportionate effect on female-
provided public goods. Thus, endogenous specialization combined with nonco-
operative decision making leads to an outcome that may give the appearance of
a preference difference between men and women. Assuming that children are
relatively time-intensive, the model is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding that
targeting transfers to women has a disproportionate impact on spending on chil-
dren.21
In this model, we return to the assumption that husbands and wives have the
21A related result in a setting with a single public good that requires only a time input is pro-
vided in Konrad and Lommerud (1995).
40same preferences across all public goods, and there is also no gap in the overall









The new elements in the model are endogenous labor supply and household pro-
duction of public goods. Each public good is produced using a Cobb-Douglas
technology using goods and time inputs, where the share of goods and time
varies. Speciﬁcally, we assume that public good i has share parameter 1¡i for the
goods input and i for time. Each public good can be produced by either spouse;
however, each spouse has to combine labor with his or her own goods contribu-
tion. For example, it is not possible to only provide the goods input and leave
it to the spouse to provide the labor.22 As before, each spouse maximizes utility,
taking the other spouse’s behavior (in particular, contributions to public goods
Cg;i) as given. The maximization problem of the spouse of gender g 2 ff;mg is
subject to the following constraints:









Eg;i di = wg(1 ¡ Hg) + Tg; (23)
Z 1
0
Hg;i di = Hg: (24)
Here Eg;i is goods spending on good i by spouse g, Hg;i is the time input for good
i, Hg is the total amount of time spouse g devotes to public goods production, wg
is the market wage, and Tg is non-earned income (e.g., an initial endowment or
lump-sum transfer). Equation (22) is the household production function, where
the share parameters depend on i. Equation (23) is the budget constraint. The
household has a time endowment of 1, so that 1 ¡ Hg is the time supplied to
the labor market. Equation (24) is the time constraint, which states that all time
22Below, we consider outcomes when general transfers between the spouses are possible.
41contributions to public goods add up to Hg.
Despite the symmetry in preferences, equilibria are generically unique in this
setting (i.e., the equilibrium is unique unless husband and wife have exactly the
same wage). The reason is that as long as there is a differences in the wage,
the spouses have a comparative advantage at providing either time- or goods-
intensive public goods. The following proposition summarizes the properties of
the equilibrium. We focus on the case of the husband having a higher wage. The
case where the wife has a higher wage is analogous.
Proposition 5 Assume 0 < wf < wm. There is a unique Nash equilibrium with the
following features. There is a cutoff ¹ i such that all public goods in the interval i 2 [0;¹ i]
are provided by the husband (i.e., the husband provides goods-intensive goods), while
public goods in the range i 2 (¹ i;1] are provided by the wife (the wife provides time-
















cf for i 2 (¹ i;1]:
(25)
If the cutoff ¹ i is interior, it is determined such that female and male provision of public

























42where (28) and (29) hold with equality for all public goods i that the wife con-
tributes to, and ¸f denotes the multiplier on the budget constraint. The corre-













In Nash equilibrium, each spouse contributes only to those public goods for
which she or he has a higher willingness to pay. To show that the equilibrium
satisﬁes the cutoff rule, we therefore have to show that the wife’s relative will-
ingness to pay strictly increases with i. Given the ﬁrst-order conditions, the ratio
of female to male preferred public-good provision for good i (in each case assum-



















This expression is strictly increasing in i (given the assumption wf < wm), which
shows that the equilibrium has to satisfy the cutoff rule. Intuitively, women pro-
vide public goods using relatively more time compared to goods because of their
low wages, which induces them to provide relatively more of the time-intensive
goods. Given the cutoff rule, (25) follows from substituting the expressions for
Eg;i and Hg;i from the ﬁrst-order conditions into the production function for pub-
lic goods, and (26) follows from equating male and female contributions at the
cutoff.
To also establish uniqueness of the equilibrium, we need to characterize the cut-
off ¹ i more sharply by ﬁrst solving for the multipliers on the budget constraint.
Plugging the ﬁrst-order conditions for the wife back into the budget constraint

































If the cutoff¹ i is interior, it is characterized by the condition that at ¹ i female- and














Notice that the left-hand side is strictly decreasing in¹ i while the right-hand side
is strictly increasing. Hence, there can be at most one solution to the equation.



















holds, we have¹ i = 1, and the husband provides all public goods. 2
With the equilibrium characterization at hand, we can now ask how changes in
relative female and male income affect outcomes. Different from the other mod-
els, we can separately consider the effect of a change in the relative wage and the
effect of gender-speciﬁc transfers. Parallel to the cases considered in Sections 5.1
and 5.2, consider ﬁrst a targeted wealth transfer, i.e., a change in unearned in-
come Tf and Tm. Given (25), we see that any two public goods that are provided
44by the same spouse both before and after a change in transfers will still be pro-
vided in the same proportion, because public-good provision is proportional to
private consumption. For the same reason, the relative change in the provision
of female- and male-provided public goods depends on the change in relative fe-
male and male private consumption. Here we ﬁnd that a transfer of income from
husband to wife raises female consumption at the expense of male consumption,
and thus also leads to a relative increase in the provision of female-provided
public goods. Under the assumption that child goods are time-intensive and
thus provided by women, the model is consistent with the observation that in-
come transfers to women lead to more child-related spending than transfers to
men. Overall, the results for income transfers closely mirror our ﬁndings for the
model with differences in preferences.
Wecan also use the model to analyze how a rise in the female wage affectspublic-
good provision. This is interesting because some of the empirical literature fo-
cuses on relative wages, and because one dimension of gender-based develop-
ment policies is to attempt to lower labor-market discrimination and increase
female earnings through measures such as increased female schooling.
Focusing on private consumption, parallel to the case of income transfers we ﬁnd
that an increase in the female wage leads to a larger increase in female private
consumption compared to male private consumption. Unlike the case of a trans-
fer, however, this does not imply that consumption of all female-provided public
goods goes up by the same factor. The reason for this discrepancy is that with
a wage increase the wife’s time allocation also changes, towards more market
work and less household production. Given that goods inputs go up and time
inputs go down, how the provision of a given public good changes depends on
its goods- and time-intensity. Importantly, there is always going to be a range of
highly time-intensive goods that will be supplied at a lower level after a female
wage increase. The following corollaries summarize these ﬁndings.
Corollary 2 Assume 0 < wf < wm. Consider the change in the equilibrium after the
wife’s transfer income increases from Tf to ~ Tf > Tf. Let ~ cf, ~ cm, and ~ Ci denote the new
equilibrium allocation. Given the increase in female resources, the cutoff between male
and female public goods provision shifts to the left. Let ~ i be the new cutoff. If the cutoff
45is interior both before and after the change, i.e., if 0 < ~ i < ¹ i < 1 holds, the provision of
public goods that are male-provided both before and after the change (i < ~ i) goes up by
a ﬁxed percentage, and the provision of public goods that are female-provided both before
and after the change (i > ¹ i) goes up by a strictly larger ﬁxed percentage.
Proof: Condition (34) implies that if the solution is interior both before and after
the change we must have ~ i < ¹ i. Given the change in the cutoff, (33) together
with (30) imply that male consumption increases, ~ cm > cm. Also, condition (26)
implies that the ratio of female to male private consumption has to increase after
the change, hence ~ cf has to increase by a larger percentage as ~ cm. Finally, (25)
implies that for ﬁxed wages the supply of a given public good is proportional to
the private consumption of the provider. The ratio between female-provided and
male-provided public goods ~ Ci= ~ Cj (where i > ¹ i > ~ i > j) therefore goes up in the
same proportion as private consumption. 2
Corollary 3 Assume that 0 < wf < wm and that transfer income is zero, Tf = Tm = 0.
Consider the change in the equilibrium after the wife’s wage increases from wf to ~ wf >
wf. Let ~ cf, ~ cm, and ~ Ci denote the new equilibrium allocation. Given the increase in the
female wage, the cutoff between male and female public goods provision will shift to the
left. Let~ i be the new cutoff. If the cutoff is interior both before and after the change, i.e.,
0 < ~ i < ¹ i < 1 holds, the provision of public goods that are male-provided both before and
after the change (i < ~ i) goes up by a ﬁxed percentage. For public goods that are female-
provided both before and after the change (i > ¹ i), the goods input in the home production
of these goods goes up by a ﬁxed percentage, and the time input goes down by a ﬁxed
percentage. There is a cutoff above which overall provision of public goods declines (i.e.,
there will be less provision of the most time-intensive goods).
Proof: Condition (34) implies that if the solution is interior both before and after
the change we must have~ i < ¹ i. Given the change in the cutoff, condition (26) im-
plies that the ratio cf=cm of female to male private consumption has to increase
after the change. Also, (33) together with (30) implies that male consumption
increases, ~ cm > cm. The proportionality of private consumption to public con-
sumption for a ﬁxed wage in (25) then implies that the provision of public goods
46that are male-provided both before and after the change (i < ~ i) goes up by the
same ﬁxed percentage as private consumption cm. Turning to female-provided
goods, equation (32) implies that the Lagrange multiplier ¸f declines, but that the
product wf¸f of wage and multiplier goes up. We can then see from (28) and (29)
that the goods spending on all female-provided goods Ef;i increases by a ﬁxed
fraction, whereas the time input Hf;i decreases by a ﬁxed fraction. Since the share
of time inputs converges to one as i approaches one, there must be a cutoff above
which overall provision of public goods declines. 2





















Figure 3: Consumption of Each Public Good for wf=wm = 0:5. Solid line: Actual
Consumption. Dashed Line: Hypothetical Provision by Spouse
We now illustrate these results with a computed example. Figure 3 shows the
distribution of public consumption over all public goods for the case where fe-
male income is half of male income, wf = 0:5 and wm = 1, and where unearned
income is zero, Tf = Tm = 0. The solid line is actual consumption, and the
dashed line shows the preferred provision of the other spouse (i.e., the level that
47the spouse who is not actually specializing in this good would have provided).
The vertical line denotes the cutoff¹ i: to the left of this point, goods are provided
by the husband, to the right they are provided by the wife. In equilibrium, each
good is provided by the spouse who is willing to provide a higher amount. The
consumption distribution has a kink at the cutoff. The good with the highest
provision is the one that requires only a time input.
























Figure 4: Consumption of Each Public Good with Transfers to Husband or Wife
Next, consider how the equilibrium provision of public goods changes if transfer
income is handed to either husband or wife. Figure 4 compares the baseline
displayed in Figure 3 to the outcome when the husband receives transfer income
of Tm = 0:2 (while keeping Tf = 0), and the case where the same transfer is
handed to the wife instead, Tf = 0:2 and Tm = 0. In line with Corollary 2, we
see that in each case transfer income leads to a higher provision of all public
goods, but the impact is larger for the public goods provided by the recipient of
the transfer. In particular, consumption of public goods with an index i close to
481, which are time-intensive and therefore provided by the wife, increase much
more if the transfer is received by the wife as opposed to the husband. Hence,
under the assumption that child goods are time intensive, the model is consistent
with the observation that directing transfers to women leads to more spending
on children. At the same time, the caveats discussed in the previous section carry
over to this model: the higher spending on female-provided public goods comes
at the expense of male-provided public goods, and overall spending on public
goods may decline if transfers are redirected towards women.


























Figure 5: Consumption of Each Public Good for Three Levels of Female Wage,
Holding Male Wage Constant at wm = 1
Next, we consider how the provision of public goods depends on the relative
female wage. To this end, Figure 5 shows public consumption distributions for
varying female wages, holding the male wage constant at wm = 1 and resetting
transfer income to zero, Tf = Tm = 0. As shown in Corollary 3, the cutoff ¹ i
(which corresponds to the kink in the consumption distribution) decreases with
49the female wage. Consumption of all public goods that are provided by the hus-
band increases as the female wage goes up. From the husband’s perspective, the
only change is that ¹ i falls, which makes it possible to concentrate spending on
fewer goods. For the female-provided goods, there are two different effects. On
the one hand, the wife has access to more resources, which tends to increase pro-
vision. But on the other hand, because of the higher wage time-intensive goods
become expensive relative to goods-intensive goods, which induces a realloca-
tion towards public goods that are less intensive in time. Consequently, we see
that provision of the most time-intensive goods declines as female wages go up.
If we interpret child goods as being highly time intensive (i.e., i close to one), this
would imply that an increase in female earnings power lowers the provision of
child goods. Spending on children in terms of goods (which is what is commonly
measured in the data) would still go up, however—the decline in provision is en-
tirely due to the time input.
This model can be extended further by allowing for voluntary transfers between
the spouses. For example, if the wife is much poorer than the husband, it may
be in the husband’s interest to give money to the wife in order to increase the
provision of public goods. It can be shown that once voluntary transfers are pos-
itive in equilibrium, marginal changes in unearned income have the same effect
regardless of whether the transfer is given to husband or wife. The reason is
that, on the margin, the person providing transfers will exactly offset exogenous
changes in transfers. At the same time, there is a wide range of conditions under
which neither spouse provides a voluntary transfer, so that we are in the situa-
tion described above. Given lack of commitment, the spouse receiving a transfer
will use only a portion of the transfer for public goods, and the remainder for
private goods that do not enter the other spouse’s utility. Voluntary transfers
will therefore only arise if the difference in wealth between the spouses is large.
Interestingly, it is not enough for the wages of the two spouses to be different. If,
for example, the wife has a much lower wage than the husband, in equilibrium
she will provide only a fairly small range of the public goods. This also implies
that she will use most of any additional transfers for private consumption, which
discourages the husband from making transfers. Thus, voluntary transfers only
arise if there is a large difference in unearned income between the spouses.
506 Extending the Model to a Dynamic Setting
One common theme of the last few sections was that even if transfers targeted to
women have the effect of raising spending on certain categories of public goods,
this may come at the expense of things that also matter, such as the total spending
on public goods. In this section, we add another facet to this picture by extend-
ing our framework to an intertemporal setting. In particular, we will construct
examples where targeted transfers lead to higher spending on public goods in
the present, but also imply lower household savings and, therefore, lead to lower
spending on public goods in the future.
For transfers to matter, as in Section 5 we have to introduce frictions in the sub-
stitution between female and male provision of public goods. For simplicity, we
base our intertemporal analysis on the model of Section 5.1, which introduces a
direct assumption that female and male contributions to public goods are imper-
fect substitutes. The new results derived in this setting carry over to the settings
discussed in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, at the expense of more complicated notation.
6.1 Exogenous Lack of Female Access to Credit Markets
We start by considering a model in which only men have access to the credit
market. Consider a two-period version of the model discussed in Section 5.1, but
without the assumption of a difference in preferences between men and women.










where t = 1;2 denotes time. As in Section 5.1, the technology for producing




In each period, the wife has income yf, and the husband has income ym. We also
introduce transfer income Tf;Tm in the ﬁrst period, so that we can distinguish
51the effects of receiving a one-time transfer from changes in permanent income
yg. The new feature is that the husband also has access to credit markets, while
the wife does not. For now, we simply take it as given that women cannot save;
in the next section we discuss one possible cause of differential credit market
access. The husband’s savings (or borrowing if negative) is denoted sm. The









Em;i;2 di = ym + (1 + r)sm; (38)








Ef;i;2 di = yf: (40)
The implications of this simple intertemporal framework are straightforward.
Men have a positive marginal propensity to save in this model, whereas (by as-
sumption of no access to credit markets) women’s propensity to save is zero.
Thus, when men receive a transfer Tm > 0 in period 1, the additional income is
divided between private consumption, public consumption, and saving. If wo-
men receive a transfer Tf, they spend a relatively larger amount on private and
public goods, because they can’t save. The ﬂipside of this difference is that af-
ter a transfer men’s public-good spending increases in the second period as well,
whereas women’s does not. Indeed, the present value of the increase in public-
good spending across both periods is the same for women and men; the only
difference is in the timing of the increase. The following proposition summarizes
these results.
Proposition 6 An increase in the transfer Tf targeted to the wife has a larger impact on






for all i. However, the present value of the increase in public-good spending over both









































































The results here closely mirror the case of a restricted access of women to private
consumption goods that was discussed in Section 5.1. In either setting, women’s
limited range of alternatives to public-good spending leads to a higher current
propensity to spend. In the context of savings markets, the result suggest that
not just current but also future spending should be examined if one would like
to determine the full impact of targeted transfers.
536.2 Endogenous Lack of Female Access to Credit Markets
An obvious shortcoming of the intertemporal model discussed so far is that the
lack of access to the credit market directly imposed. Even if women indeed had
difﬁculty saving (as is suggested by a strand of the applied literature), the under-
lying reason for this friction may still matter for results. While we cannot provide
a comprehensive analysis of the issue here, we present one way of endogenizing
credit market frictions. Given our emphasis on noncooperative bargaining, we
focus on a channel that arises as a direct consequence of this mode of decision
making. Speciﬁcally, we introduce two new features to our setting: altruism be-
tween the spouses, and voluntary transfers. We show that in this setting the
expectation of future transfers between spouses can work like an implicit tax on
savings, and consequently push one of the spouses to a no-savings corner even
if credit markets are accessible in principle.
We extend the preference speciﬁcation of the model in the previous section by in-
troducinganaltruisticconcernforthespouse’sprivateconsumption. Thespouse’s
utility enters with weight ®, where 0 < ® < 1. That is, spouses care about each
other, but they still value their own private consumption more than the spouse’s










where ¡g denotes the gender opposite to g. The technology for producing public
goods is still given by (36) above. Regarding access to credit markets, we assume
that both spouses can save, but not borrow, at the constant interest rate r. In each
period, women and men receive the ﬁxed income yf and ym, respectively, and
transfer income in the initial period is denoted by Tf and Tm. Due to the pres-
ence of altruism we also allow for the possibility of voluntary transfers between
the spouses. In equilibrium, at most one spouse will be making transfers, and
for simplicity we assume that this is the husband (i.e., the husband is the richer
spouse). In addition, we assume that a voluntary transfer is possible only in the









Em;i;2 di = ym + (1 + r)sm ¡ X; (43)
sm;X ¸ 0; (44)








Ef;i;2 di = yf + (1 + r)sf + X; (46)
sf ¸ 0: (47)
The timing of decisions is as follows. In the ﬁrst period, the spouses ﬁrst simul-
taneously choose savings sf and sm, and then decide on the consumption alloca-
tion using the remaining funds. In the second period, the husband ﬁrst decides
on the transfer X, and then each spouse decides on consumption. We focus on
subgame-perfect equilibria.
We are interested in the interaction of voluntary transfers and savings. Given that
altruism is limited (® < 1), if the income of the two spouses is not too far apart
no transfers will take place, and each spouse will choose the optimal savings
and consumption allocation individually. The interesting case is therefore the
one where income inequality between the spouses is sufﬁciently large (ym much
larger than yf) for the husband to choose X > 0. Consider how the expectation of
a transfer affects the wife’s incentives for saving in the ﬁrst period. Saving has the
netreturnofr. However, whenthewife’sresourcesincreaseinthesecondperiod,
the husband will optimally react to this by lowering the transfer X. Hence, when
deciding on savings the wife has to take the negative impact of an increase in sf
23Allowing for transfers in both periods is straightforward, but complicates notation. The key
interaction is between current savings and future expected voluntary transfers, which is why we
focus on transfers in the second period.
55on X into account. The expectation of an endogenous future transfer thus acts as
an implicit tax on savings. This implicit tax may induce the wife not to save at all
and go to the corner sf = 0.
Going one further step back, consider how the allocation depends on the initial
transfer income Tf and Tm. If we are in the corner region sf = 0, a marginal
increase in female transfer income Tf will not affect saving, whereas an increase
in the male transfer Tm will. Returning to the child expenditure implications,
it follows that a transfer payment to the wife increases child expenditures in the
ﬁrstperiodbymorethanatransfertoherhusband. However, thepicturechanges
if expenditures in the second period are taken into account. The present value of











We will show below that transfers to the wife and the husband have exactly the
same impact on the present value of public-good spending; the only difference is
in the timing of changes. Thus, the model reproduces the overall implication of
the setup with an exogenous restriction on credit market access, with the differ-
ence that here abstention from saving is voluntary and driven by expected future
transfers within the family. The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 7 Assume that transfer income is zero initially, Tf = Tm = 0. For any
interest rate r sufﬁciently high to induce positive savings, there is a threshold Â > 0
such that if ym=yf > Â, voluntary transfers are positive, X > 0, male saving is positive,
sm > 0, and female saving is zero, sf = 0. In addition, in this region an increase in the
transfer Tf targeted to the wife has a larger impact on current public-good spending than






for all i. However, the present value of the increase in public-good spending over both










Proof: Given our focus on subgame-perfect equilibria, we can solve for the equi-
librium by backward induction. After the transfer X has been made, the ﬁrst-

















(ym + (1 + r)sm ¡ X):
Going back one step, we can now consider the husband’s problem of determin-
ing X, where the husband takes yf, ym, sf, and sm as given. Plugging the optimal
consumption allocation in the husband’s second period utility and dropping con-
stants, the husband solves:
max
X¸0
f3log(ym + (1 + r)sm ¡ X) + (1 + 2®)log(yf + (1 + r)sf + X)g:
The optimal choice is therefore given by:
X = max
½





The transfer depends on the pre-transfer income gap between the spouses, and
on the degree of altruism. For example, if the husband were fully altruistic
(® = 1), the husband would transfer exactly half of the income gap to the wife to
equalize male and female consumption. The important feature for our purposes
is that the transfer is decreasing in female saving sf, which places an implicit tax
on female saving.
57Going back one more step, the choice of savings sf by the wife in the region




3log(yf + Tf ¡ sf)
+ 3log(yf + (1 + r)sf + X(sf)) + (1 + 2®)log(ym + (1 + r)sm ¡ X(sf))
ª
:
Here X(sf) is the transfer received in the second period as a function of own
savings. At the savings stage, wife and husband take each other’s saving deci-









of X by the husband implies that only total income matters for consumption in
this period (as long as X remains interior). The ﬁrst-order condition for sf is:
3
yf + Tf ¡ sf
¸
(4 + 2®)(1 + r)
yf + ym + (1 + r)(sf + sm)
;
where the inequality is strict if sf = 0. The corresponding ﬁrst-order condition
for the husband is:
3
ym + Tm ¡ sm
¸
(4 + 2®)(1 + r)
yf + ym + (1 + r)(sf + sm)
;
where the inequality is strict if sm = 0. We would like to show that at Tm = Tf =
0 for a sufﬁciently high interest rate r and a male-female income ratio above a
certain threshold, ym=yf > Â, the solution to the ﬁrst order conditions features
sm > 0 and sf = 0, i.e., only the husband saves. Solving the husband’s ﬁrst-order
condition for sm under the assumptions sf = 0 and Tm = Tf = 0 yields:
sm =
(4 + 2®)(1 + r)ym ¡ 3(yf + ym)
(7 + 2®)(1 + r)
: (49)





(4 + 2®)(1 + r)








(7 + 2®)(1 + r) ¡ 3
3(2 + r)
´ Â: (50)
To see that the desired equilibrium exists for sufﬁciently high r and ym=yf, ﬁrst
note that for any given yf and ym the interest rate r can be chosen high enough
such that sm in (49) is positive. Then, holding the interest rate ﬁxed we can raise
ym until the condition (50) is satisﬁed. Notice that raising ym also increases sav-
ings sm, so that sm continues to be positive.
As the ﬁnal step, we would like to determine how introducing transfer income
Tf and Tm in the ﬁrst period affects the equilibrium at the margin. Given the
corner solution for savings, a marginal increase in Tf has no effect on saving and
on public-good spending in the second period, but affects public-good spending







For the husband, an increase in Tm leads both to an increase in public-good
spending in the ﬁrst and in the second period. Moreover, the wife’s public good
spending in the second period reacts as well, due to the endogenous transfer X.



















(1 + r)(1 + 2®)
3(7 + 2®)
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Intuitively, no matter how the additional income gets distributed between the
two periods and the two spouses, in the end one-third gets spent on public goods
and two-thirds on private goods. 2
The results in this section show that the appearance of a preference difference be-
tween men and women (in the sense that women spend more of current income
on public goods) can arise as a direct consequence of noncooperative decision
making, providedthatincomeinequalitybetweenmenandwomenissufﬁciently
large. Other types of frictions that limit women’s access to credit markets would
lead to similar ﬁndings. The general conclusion is that a comprehensive analysis
of the effects of gender-speciﬁc transfers should account for possible effects on
savings, investment, and future public-goods spending.
7 Summary and Outlook
In this paper, we have addressed from a theoretical perspective the empirical
observation that money in the hands of women leads to higher spending on pub-
lic goods, and in particular to higher spending on child-related goods. These
observations have already led to a trend in development policy to target more
resources to women and more generally to envision female empowerment as
a key measure to foster economic development. However, to fully understand
the effects of such gender-based development policies, one needs to know the
mechanism that generates the observed empirical ﬁndings. To this end, we have
developed a series of models of marital decision making that can explain the em-
60pirical facts, and we have examined what these models imply for the effects of
gender-based development policy.
From the perspective of the theory of the household, a ﬁrst ﬁnding is that a large
classofcommonlyusedmodelsofmaritaldecisionmakingarenotabletoexplain
the facts. In particular, models such as the unitary model or the collective model
implyanincomepoolingresult, whichisclearlyinconsistentwiththedata. While
this fact is not surprising and well known, we show that the income-pooling re-
sult survives even if decision making is noncooperative and if there are prefer-
ence asymmetries between men and women in terms of the overall appreciation
of public goods. To break the income-pooling result, further frictions or asym-
metries are needed. We present a series of models that can explain the facts: ﬁrst,
limited availability of female-speciﬁc private goods, coupled with imperfect sub-
stitutability of male and female contributions to public goods; second, preference
asymmetries in the relative appreciation of different public goods; third, house-
hold production where goods differ in the importance of time and goods inputs,
coupled with a gender wage differential; and fourth, gender-speciﬁc distortions
in the consumption-saving choice, either through the endogenous provision of
transfers between the spouses, or because of institutional restrictions.
Whilethesedifferentmodelshavedistinctpolicyimplications, twooverallthemes
stand out. First, even when the models conﬁrm a positive effect of transfers tar-
geted to women on expenditures on child goods, it may be the case that this
higher spending comes at the expense of other important public goods. For ex-
ample, in the model with time and goods components of household production
anincreaseingoodsspendingmaybeoffsetbyadeclineintimeinputs. Similarly,
in the intertemporal model an increase in current spending may correspond to a
decline in household saving and therefore lower future spending. In such set-
tings, it is far from obvious whether targeting transfers to women is good policy.
Second, the models suggest that different ways of achieving female empower-
ment may have different or even opposite effects. In some of our models, the dif-
ferences in gender spending patterns are themselves endogenous and would dis-
appear if other gender differences were removed. Thus, while targeting transfers
to women may increase spending on children, reducing gender discrimination
61in goods or labor markets may result in women behaving more like men, which
reduces the effect of targeted transfers on public good provision. The models
therefore provide a warning against viewing female empowerment as a generic
concept and advocate a more differentiated view that distinguishes various chan-
nels.
Perhaps the most important conclusion arising from this work is that more mea-
surement and empirical work is needed to distinguish between the various the-
oretical models outlined above. The empirical implications of the models are
quite distinct and could in principle be tested. In particular, empirical research to
date has mostly focused on expenditures on a few salient public goods that can
be easily observed and quantiﬁed such as clothing, food, and education. How-
ever, our analysis implies that also accounting for effects on savings, consumer
durables, and general household public goods is essential to distinguish between
the different mechanisms. Only once we have some conﬁdence in which of these
models provides the best guide to reality will we be in a position to provide valu-
able policy recommendation for gender-based development initiatives.
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